






















































or	the	soul	from	its	perceptions”	(THN	1.4.5.5).	Among	the	things	we	can	conceive	are	qualities	and	perceptions.	So	qualities	and	perceptions	are	individual	substances,	by	that	definition.31		 Here	Hume	directly	attacks	Locke’s	assumption	about	“those	Qualities,	we	find	existing,	which	we	imagine	cannot	subsist,	sine	re	substante,	without	something	to	support	them”	(ECHU	2.23.2).	To	the	contrary,	Hume	argues	that	their	independent	existence	is	easily	conceived.		 Hume	argues	this	to	be	the	case	with	a	compressed	argument	that	glosses	over	a	number	of	distinctions	he	ought	to	be	making.	The	argument	makes	use	of	his	Separability	Principle,	which	is	really	a	family	of	principles	that	should	be	teased	apart.32		 Hume	holds	that	all	things	numerically	distinct	are	separable	in	reality,	and	conversely.	Let	me	call	this	principle,	the	Real	Separability	Principle.	Strictly	speaking,	it	is	not	a	principle	for	Hume,	since	he	derives	it	from	two	others:	what	I	will	call	the	Mental	Separability	Principle	and	the	Conceivability	Principle.		 Hume	states	the	Mental	Separability	Principle	early	on:		First,	We	have	observ’d,	that	whatever	objects	are	different	are	distinguishable,	and	that	whatever	objects	are	distinguishable	are	separable	by	the	thought	and	imagination.	And	we	may	here	add,	that	these	propositions	are	equally	true	in	the	inverse	and	that	whatever																																																									31	See	THN	1.4.5.24	and	the	discussion	of	this	passage	in	my	section	II.	32	Garrett	speaks	simply	of	the	Separability	Principle	and	says	it	and	its	converse	are	new	with	Hume	(1997:	58).	See	also	Bricke	1980:	68.	However,	see	Descartes’s	discussion	of	distinctions	in	Principles,	Part	I,	Principles	LX-LXII,	in	CSM:	160-212,	as	well	as	medieval	and	ancient	antecedents	such	as	those	cited	in	Bosley	2006.	See	Laird	against	the	mental	separability	principle	(1931:	82-83).		
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objects	are	separable	are	also	distinguishable,	and	that	whatever	objects	are	distinguishable	are	also	different.	(THN	1.1.7.3)  I	assume	from	context	that	by	“in	the	inverse”	Hume	means	what	we	mean	by	‘conversely’.		 When	Hume	says	‘different’	he	means	numerically	distinct.	For	instance,	in	discussing	time,	he	argues	that	the	impression	of	time	that	one	has	in	hearing	five	musical	notes	is	not	“different”	from	the	impressions	of	the	notes	themselves,	which	is	to	say	it	is	“not	a	sixth	impression”	(THN	1.2.3.10).	Were	it	different,	it	would	be	a	sixth	impression,	i.e.,	numerically	distinct.	Likewise	at	one	point	he	explicitly	uses	the	phrase	‘numerically	different’.33		 When	Hume	says	that	things	are	“distinguishable,”	he	means	that	we	can	think	of	them	as	numerically	distinct.	As	he	argues	in	his	passage	on	distinctions	of	reason,	where	we	cannot	think	of	things	as	numerically	distinct,	they	are	“in	effect	the	same	and	undistinguishable.”	Any	apparent	distinguishing	of	“them”	is	really	a	distinguishing	of	things	related	to	“them.”34		 When	Hume	says	objects	are	“separable	by	the	thought	and	imagination”	he	means	that	it	is	possible	to	cease	thinking	of	one	while	continuing	to	think	of	the	other.	Presumably	we	would	do	this	by	ceasing	to	have	an	idea	of	the	one	while	continuing	to	have	an	idea	of	the	other.	When	things	are	inseparable	by	the	thought	and	imagination	it	is	not	possible	to	think	of	one	while	ceasing	to	think	of	the	other.	For	instance,	“A	person,	who	desires	us	to	consider	the	figure	of	a	globe	of	white																																																									33	THN	1.3.1.1.	34	THN	1.1.7.18.	For	additional	discussion	of	less	than	numerical	distinction	see	section	VI.	
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	 Suarez	takes	the	modal	distinction	to	be	a	less	than	numerical	distinction	involving	asymmetric	inseparability.	The	mode	is	inseparable	from	the	substance,	but	not	vice-versa.40		 Hume	does	seem	to	attribute	to	“theologians”	some	sort	of	less	than	numerical	distinction	between	substance	and	modification.	Their	three	criticisms	of	Spinoza	that	he	presents	depend	on	taking	differences	between	modes	to	apply	to	the	undifferentiated	substance	that	they	depend	on.	That	is	fair	only	if	the	modes	are	not	numerically	distinct	from	the	substance.	As	Hume	says,	according	to	“the	scholastic	way	of	talking	.	.	.	a	mode,	not	being	any	distinct	or	separable	existence,	must	be	the	very	same	with	its	substance	.	.	.	“41	So	the	supposed	distinction	between	mode	and	substance	is	not	supposed	to	be	numerical	distinction.		 However,	Hume	would	take	the	notion	of	a	less	than	numerical	distinction	as	untenable.	He	would	criticize	it	the	way	Ockham	criticized	Scotus’s	formal	distinction.	As	Ockham	puts	it,	“But	among	creatures	the	same	thing	cannot	be	truly	affirmed	and	truly	denied	of	the	same	thing.”	According	to	Ockham,	if	there	is	any	difference	between	two	(created)	things	then	they	are	numerically	distinct.42	Hume	does	not	state	this	principle	explicitly	but	appears	to	presuppose	it	when	he	says	the	following	of	a	compound,	altering	body	that	we	regard	as	a	simple,	identical	thing:	“The	acknowledg’d	composition	is	evidently	contrary	to	this	suppos’d	simplicity,	and	the	variation	to	the	identity”	(THN	1.4.3.2).	Identical	things	cannot	differ.	As	we	would	put	it,	he	holds	Leibniz’s	Law.																																																									40	Suarez	1947:	sect.	2,	no.	6,	p.	44.	See	also	Descartes,	Principles	I.LXI	in	CSM.	41	THN	1.4.5.22-25.	42	Ockham	exempts	things	pertaining	to	God,	such	as	the	Persons	of	the	Trinity.	William	of	Ockham,	Ordinatio	I,	distinction	ii,	qu.	6,	in	Spade	1994:	156.	
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	 If	a	substance	is	independent	of	any	other	existent	whatsoever,	whereas	a	mode	is	not,	then	they	differ.	If	they	differ	they	are	numerically	distinct.	So	they	are	not	merely	modally	distinct.		 Confirmation	that	Hume	considered	and	rejected	any	sort	of	modal	distinction	is	given	when	he	says,	“Our	perceptions	are	all	really	different,	and	separable,	and	distinguishable	from	each	other,	and	from	every	thing	else,	which	we	can	imagine;	and	therefore	’tis	impossible	to	conceive,	how	they	can	be	the	action	or	abstract	mode	of	any	substance”	(THN	1.4.5.27).		 One	might	object	that	Hume	himself	gives	an	example	of	asymmetric	inseparability.	A	whole	cannot	strictly	speaking	exist	without	having	all	its	parts.	“But	supposing	some	very	small	or	inconsiderable	part	to	be	added	to	the	mass,	or	substracted	from	it;	tho’	this	absolutely	destroys	the	identity	of	the	whole,	strictly	speaking;	yet	as	we	seldom	think	so	accurately,”	etc.	(THN	1.4.6.8).	The	parts,	being	distinct,	are	all	separable	from	each	other.	So	a	part	can	exist	without	the	whole.	So	here	is	an	asymmetric	inseparability.	Hakkarainen	argues	that	this	asymmetric	inseparability	forces	us	to	recognize	a	third	type	of	distinction	in	Hume.	In	addition	to	real	distinctions	(i.e.	numerical	distinctions)	and	distinctions	of	reason	(i.e.	conceptual	distinctions)	we	must	see	Hume	as	committed	to	what	Hakkarainen,	following	David	Lewis,	calls	a	“partial	distinction.”	This	partial	distinction	is	a	special	version	of	the	modal	distinction	for	wholes	and	their	parts.		 Hakkarainen	is	candid	that	Hume	explicitly	countenances	no	such	third	distinction.	However,	he	contends,	Hume	needs	it	to	resolve	a	glaring	contradiction	
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between	Hume’s	Separability	Principle	and	the	fact	that	Hume	explicitly	says	that	wholes	depend	on	their	parts.	43		 I	think	there	is	a	better	way	to	go	that	is	truer	to	the	text.	Hume	has	said	that	the	definition	of	a	substance--”something	which	may	exist	by	itself”--applies	to	“every	thing,	that	can	possibly	be	conceiv’d”	(THN	1.4.5.5).	If	a	whole	can	be	conceived,	then	it	can’t	depend	on	its	parts.	It	must	be	able	to	exist	without	them.	So	a	whole	is	not	a	thing	that	can	possibly	be	conceived.	As	Hume’s	Malezieu	argument	concluded,	a	whole	of	parts,	strictly	speaking,	does	not	exist.	“It”	is	nothing	but	the	many	parts,	perhaps	in	some	relation.	Clearly	they	cannot	exist	collectively	unless	each	of	them	exist.	But	each	can	exist	without	them	all	existing	collectively.		These	facts	give	the	appearance	of	asymmetric	inseparability	if	wholes	are	said	to	exist.	However,	there	is	no	asymmetric	inseparability	between	things	that	strictly	speaking	exist.			 Thus	Hume	has	an	answer	to	the	charge	that	his	rejection	of	inhesion	overlooked	the	possibility	of	a	modal	distinction	between	mode	and	substance.	So	he	can	safely	conclude	that	inhesion	is	impossible.		
VII.	No	such	thing	as	pure	substance		 If	there	is	such	a	thing	as	a	pure	substance,	it	is	the	principle	of	unity	and	identity	for	an	individual	in	which	accidents	inhere.	As	Locke	says,	it	is	“the	supposed,	but	unknown	support	of	those	Qualities,	we	find	existing,	which	we	imagine	cannot	subsist	.	.	.	without	something	to	support	them,”	and	which	is	the	“Cause	of	their	Union”	in	an	individual	substance	(ECHU	2.23.2,	6).		However,	first,	nothing	can	be	a	principle	of	unity	and	identity	for	a	collection	of	distinct	qualities,																																																									43	Hakkarainen	2012:	56-7.	
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nor	a	succession	of	them,	as	argued	in	II	and	III.	Adding	an	additional	thing	to	several	distinct	things	does	not	result	in	unitariness.44	Second,	nothing	can	be	something	in	which	something	that	differs	from	it	inheres,	since	there	is	no	such	thing	as	inherence,	as	argued	in	VI.	There	is	no	dependence	between	numerically	distinct	things	and	no	modal	distinction.	For	these	two	reasons	individually	and	jointly,	there	is	no	such	thing	as	pure	substance.	Appeal	to	a	principle	of	unity	and	identity	in	which	distinct	accidents	inhere	is	the	way	that	substance/accident	theorists	like	Locke	try	to	have	complex	unities	without	them	breaking	up	into	numerically	distinct	independent	existences.	However	for	Hume,	the	breakup	is	unavoidable,	given	(i)	the	Convertibility	of	Unity	and	Being,	(ii)	the	Real	Separability	principle,	and	(iii)	Leibniz’s	Law.	From	there	it	is	up	to	natural	psychological	principles	to	explain	why	we	hold	the	fiction	of	complex	unities--a	fiction	so	firmly	believed	that	philosophers	dreamt	up	the	theory	of	substance	and	accident	to	try	to	capture	it.45,	46		
																																																								44	Cf.	Aristotle,	“A	substance	cannot	consist	of	substances	present	in	it	in	complete	reality	(Aristotle	1941,	Metaphysics	VII.13,	1039a2-14).	See	also	Leibniz’s	claim	“that	a	substance	is	not	divisible	into	two”	(Discourse	on	Metaphysics,	section	9,	in	AG).		45	See	THN	1.4.3.1.	46	I’m	grateful	to	Toby	Napoletano	for	research	assistance.	
